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WHEN THE INK DRIES, WHOSE TATT IS IT ANYWAY?
THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF TATTOOS
As a tattoo is grounded on living skin, so its essence emotes a poignancy
unique to the mortal human condition.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Tattoos being used as a form of body modification predates
2000 B.C.2  Over time, people have used tattoos to show dedication
to their faith, as a form of status, and as a physical manifestation of
art.3  Tattoos have grown in popularity through the years, becoming
less taboo, and today, nearly 40% of “millennials” have at least one
tattoo.4
Within the sports industry, tattoos are extremely prevalent.5
Many would assume that the bearer of the tattoo owns the tattoo.6
However, there is a difference between owning the tattoo that is
placed on one’s body and owning the copyright to the tattoo design
1. MARGO DEMELLO, BODIES OF INSCRIPTION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE
MODERN TATTOO COMMUNITY 1 (2000) (quoting V. Vale & Andrea Juno).
2. See Cate Linberry, Tattoos: The Ancient and Mysterious History, SMITHSONIAN
(Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/tattoos-144038580/
[https://perma.cc/EUB5-SDKU] (“In terms of tattoos on actual bodies, the earli-
est known examples were for a long time Egyptian and were present on several
female mummies dated to c. 2000 B.C.  But following the more recent discovery of
the Iceman from the area of the Italian-Austrian border in 1991 and his tattoo
patterns, this date has been pushed back a further thousand years when he was
carbon-dated at around 5,200 years old.”).
3. See id. (“These permanent designs—sometimes plain, sometimes elaborate,
always personal—have served as amulets, status symbols, declarations of love, signs
of religious beliefs, adornments and even forms of punishment.”).
4. See Shontavia Johnson, Why Your Tattoo May Leave You Open to a Copyright
Infringement Lawsuit, RAW STORY (Aug. 8, 2016, 1:51PM), http://www.rawstory
.com/2016/08/copyright-and-trademark-laws-mean-your-tattoo-may-leave-you-
open-to-an-infringement-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/7T6C-WC8T] (“More than
20 percent of all Americans have at least one tattoo, and for millennials that num-
ber jumps to almost 40 percent.”).
5. See Athletes and Their Tattoos: From A-Z, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 11, 2018),
http://www.si.com/more-sports/photos/2008/01/11-3athletes-and-their-tattoos-
from-a-z [https://perma.cc/5JZL-DU7W] (listing numerous athletes that play vari-
ous sports and tattoos that athletes have).
6. For further discussion about the differentiation between authorship and
ownership, see infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. R
(275)
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itself.7  As of late, there has been an increase in tattoo artists filing
lawsuits alleging copyright infringement against companies and
athletes.8
Solid Oak Sketches, LLC filed one of the most recent lawsuits
concerning the copyrightability and copyright ownership of tattoos
when it sued Visual Concepts LLC, 2K Games, Inc. and Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc.9  Solid Oak Sketches alleged that the de-
fendants committed copyright infringement when they digitally cre-
ated tattoos featured on athletes’ avatars in the game NBA2K.10
Solid Oak Sketches alleged it owned the copyrights to tattoos fea-
tured on numerous icons in the NBA, including tattoos on Kobe
7. See Yolanda M. King, The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, 22 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 29, 35 (2014) [hereinafter King 2] (“Ownership and authorship
become conflated in the context of tattoos because of the uniqueness of the me-
dium on which the work is affixed.”).  For further discussion about the differentia-
tion between authorship and ownership, see infra notes 71–77 and accompanying R
text.
8. See Samantha Elie, Whose Tattoo? Body Art and Copyright (Part I), CTR. FOR
ART L. (Mar. 16, 2016), https://itsartlaw.com/2016/03/16/whose-tattoos-tattoos-
and-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/Y5X5-J63M] (providing a detailed list of cases
brought over past decade by tattoo artist claiming copyright infringement); Aaron
Gordon, Who Owns Tattoos?, VICE SPORTS (Feb. 9, 2016), https://sports.vice.com/
en_us/article/who-owns-tattoos [https://perma.cc/S5UZ-8C45] (detailing lawsuit
filed by Solid Oak and causes of action therein).
9. See generally Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., No. 16-cv-00724-
LTS, 2016 WL 4126543 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). See also Complaint, Solid Oak Sketches,
No:1:16-cv-00724, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/29757119
1/Solid-Oak-Sketches-v-Take-Two (providing pdf of Solid Oak’s complaint against
Take-Two); Darren Rovell, Makers of NBA2K Sued for Using Players’ Tattoos Without
Permission, ESPN (Feb.1, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/
14693836/makers-nba2k-sued-graphically-representing-tattoos-players-permission
[https://perma.cc/Q7XM-RKNW] (summarizing why Solid Oak sued for copy-
right infringement for use of tattoos in NBA2K).  The Southern District of New
York noted that Section 412 of the Copyright Act is a “bright-line rule” that does
not permit alleged plaintiffs to seek recovery for statutory damages and attorney’s
fees if the alleged infringement occurred before the plaintiff received copyright
registration for the work that was infringed upon. Solid Oak Sketeches, 2016 WL
4126543, at *2.  Solid Oak Sketches did not receive copyright registrations for the
tattoos before 2K and Take Two digitally recreated the tattoos. Id.  Therefore, its
claim was dismissed. Id. at *4.  This created a new argument that a defendant can
use if the defendant copied the tattoo before the tattoo received copyright registra-
tion. See id.
10. See id. at *2; Eriq Gardner, ‘NBA2K’ Videogame Maker Sued for Copyright In-
fringement over LeBron James Tattoos, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 1, 2016, 2:25 PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/nba-2k-videogame-maker-sued-8611
31 [https://perma.cc/PF7N-SZJ6] (“The action was filed on Monday in New York
federal court by Solid Oak Sketches, which claims to own copyright to several tat-
too designs featured on the bodies of NBA stars LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, Ken-
yon Martin, DeAndre Jordan and Eric Bledsoe.  Solid Oak is suing Take-Two
Interactive Software and other companies associated with the videogame NBA
2K16 for unauthorized reproductions of those tattoo designs.”).
2
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Bryant and LeBron James.11  Consequently, they sought $1.1 mil-
lion for an unauthorized reproduction of the copyrighted tattoos.12
When purported copyright owners of tattoos file lawsuits, the
issues that must be addressed are whether tattoos are copyrightable
and if so, who owns the copyright of the tattoos.13  Because all previ-
ous cases filed by tattoo artists who alleged copyright infringement
settled before going to trial, there is a lack of case law on which
potential plaintiffs can rely.14  Without clear precedent, both plain-
tiffs and defendants have little to rely on when evaluating their
prospects of success at trial.15  This absence of case law leaves tattoo
artists, their clients, and third parties in limbo.16
Rendering a decision about whether tattoos are copyrightable,
and who would own such copyright, affects numerous industries
11. See Gardner, supra note 10 (noting how Solid Oak owns copyright to vari- R
ous athletes’ tattoos).
12. See Gordon, supra note 8 (“On February 1, Solid Oak Sketches, a small R
agency that represents tattoo artists, sued the makers of the popular video game
series NBA2K for $1.1 million for digitally recreating the tattoos on the bodies of
popular basketball players, including LeBron James and Kobe Bryant, without per-
mission from the artists who inked them in the real world.”).
13. See Matthew Belloni, Waner Bros. Settles ‘Hangover II’ Tattoo Lawsuit (Exclu-
sive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter
.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377 [https://perma.cc/RMB7-
3K2C] (“As we noted when the case was filed, copyrighted works are copyrighted
works, no matter whether they are painted on canvases or walls or the bodies of
former heavyweight champions.”); see also David M. Cummings, Comment, Creative
Expression and the Human Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art
Form, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 279, 282 (2013) (“This Note addresses the many issues
that could arise if tattoos were the subject of copyright protection.  It does so by
evaluating tattoos under the Copyright Act in order to determine whether the Act,
in relevant part, can—and should—be logically extended to include this genre.”).
But see Lauren Etter, Tattoo Artists Are Asserting Their Copyright Claims, ABA J. (Jan. 1,
2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tattoo_artists_are_asserting
_their_copyright_claims [https://perma.cc/6YG7-7AZ5] (“Some have worried that
all this litigation could result in people having to sign over the rights to their body
anytime they are tattooed.”).
14. See Timothy C. Bradley, The Copyright Implication of Tattoos: Why Getting In-
ked Can Get You into Court, 29 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 31 (2011) (“[D]isputes will con-
tinue to settle before trial, considering that the disputes . . . have much at stake,
and the incentive to settle is high.”).
15. See Jennifer L. Commander, Comment, The Player, the Video Game, and the
Tattoo Artist: Who Has the Most Skin in the Game?, 72 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 1947, 1950
(2015) (“Television networks, magazine publishers, and video game creators all
need answers regarding their legal exposure when it comes to feature athletes’
tattoos, but not a single court has addressed the issue head-on.”); see also Cum-
mings, supra note 13, at 281 (“In fact, the extension of copyright protection to R
tattoos on human flesh is an issue of first impression—one that is yet to be ruled
on by the Supreme Court of the United States—and thus the legal uncertainties
are unprecedented and unresolved.”).
16. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1950 (explaining how lack of precedent R
addressing copyrightability of tattoos affects large industries).
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that are driven by celebrities’ personas.17  When a tattoo becomes
so recognizable that it is the primary source of a celebrity’s identity,
there is a gray area about where that tattoo can be used without
infringing on a tattoo artist’s copyrights.18 The difficulty of balanc-
ing a copyright owner’s interest in protecting how their work is be-
ing used with a tattoo bearer’s interest in their right of publicity
and right to autonomy contributes to the gray area.19
There are two different categories of tattoos that are the focus
of this article. The first is ‘contemporaneously-placed tattoos,’
which are tattoos that are simultaneously designed and applied on a
person’s body without a preliminary stencil, sketch, or drawing.20
The tattooist creates a picture without guidance from a premade
outline.21 The other is ‘preliminarily-sketched tattoos,’ which are
previously created stencils or drawings that are later tattooed on a
person’s skin.22  The stencil or drawing is then placed on the pa-
tron’s arm as a reference when the tattooist begins to place ink on
the skin.23  The difference between the two methods is that contem-
poraneously-placed tattoos require no preparation on behalf of the
tattooist because the tattooist designs the tattoo as they go along,
and preliminary sketch requires preparatory work on behalf of the
tattooist.24
This comment addresses whether contemporaneously-placed
tattoos and preliminarily-sketched tattoos are copyrightable and
17. See id. (explaining how lack of precedent addressing copyrightability of
tattoos affects large industries).
18. See Yolanda M. King, The Right-of-Publicity Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, 16
NEV. L.J. 441, 453 (2016) [hereinafter King 3] (“A number of celebrities possess
other indicia of identity, and a tattoo prominently fixed on the body of one of
those celebrities should become an identifiable part of the celebrity’s identity.”).
19. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 279 (“[B]alancing the rights of the artist R
to retain control over her creation with the rights of the tattoo recipient to retain
bodily autonomy”).
20. See Michael C. Minahan, Comment, Copyright Protection for Tattoos: Are Tat-
toos Copies?, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1728 (2015) (“[A] tattoo artist may
choose to create a tattoo contemporaneously with the tattooing client, without bas-
ing the tattoo on any work.”).
21. See id. (defining contemporaneous tattoos)
22. See id. (“For a more custom or unique tattoo, a client might present the
tattoo artist with his or her ideas for a tattoo then work with the tattoo artist to
develop a preliminary drawing which will become the basis for the subsequent
tattoo.”).
23. See id. (defining what  preliminarily-sketched tattoo and how it is created
by  tattooist).
24. See id. (discussing differences between contemporaneously-placed and
preliminarily-sketched tattoos).
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who owns the copyright if they are.25  Part II provides an overview
of the prerequisites for a work to receive copyright and whether
tattoos can meet those requirements.26  Next, Part II exhibits exam-
ples of tattoo artists exercising their copyrights, and follows up by
listing defenses an alleged infringer can use against copyright in-
fringement claims.27  Part III argues that courts should not extend
copyright protection to contemporaneously-placed tattoos or pre-
liminarily-sketched tattoos, but to preliminary drawings that are
placed on paper and later tattooed on an individual’s skin.28  Part
IV analyzes what impact extending copyright protection only to pre-
liminary drawings would have on the sports industry.29
II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT: IS PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS SKIN-DEEP?
To determine whether copyright protection can be extended
to contemporaneously-placed tattoos and preliminarily-sketched
tattoos, the first step is to review and understand pertinent portions
of the Copyright Act and copyright law.30  Section A outlines the
requirements to be considered copyrightable subject matter and
analyzes whether tattoo meets the prerequisites.31  Section B exam-
ines the process used to decide who owns the copyright to a tattoo
and concludes that if contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-
sketched tattoos are copyrightable, it is likely that tattoo artist are
the sole authors and therefore the sole copyright owners of tat-
25. For further discussion about whether copyright protection should be ex-
tended to tattoos, see infra notes 185–252 and accompanying text. R
26. For further discussion about the requirements for a work to be copyright-
able and whether tattoos meet the requirements, see infra notes 35–59 and accom- R
panying text.
27. For further discussion of tattoo artists exercising their rights and defenses
that can be used against copyright infringement claims, see infra notes 60–184 and R
accompanying text.
28. For further discussion about why copyright protection should not be ex-
tended to contemporaneously-placed or preliminarily-sketched tattoos and should
be extended to preliminary drawings under specific circumstances, see infra
185–252 and accompanying text. R
29. For further discussion about what impact extending copyright protection
only to preliminary drawings would have on the sports industry, see infra notes
253–262 and accompanying text. R
30. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 106, 107, 201, 407 (2012) (pertinent
portions of Copyright Act). See also Cummings, supra note 13, 282 (“In order to R
determine whether the Copyright Act logically applies to tattoos, it is important to
first understand the relevant portions of copyright law.”).  The Copyright Act is
lengthy and codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810.
31. For a discussion about the requirements to be considered copyrightable
subject matter and whether tattoo meets the prerequisites, see infra notes 35–59 R
and accompanying text.
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toos.32  Section C provides an overview of tattoo artists’ exclusive
rights, examples of tattoo artists enforcing their rights, and the
broader ramifications of each case settling before going to trial.33
Section D provides an overview of defenses that can be used by de-
fendants (tattoo bearers and third parties) to assert why their al-
leged conduct does not equate to copyright infringement, with
some of the defenses assuming that contemporaneously-placed and
preliminarily-sketched tattoos are copyrightable and others attack-
ing why contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched tat-
toos are not copyrightable.34
A. Prerequisites to Being Copyrightable Subject Matter
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine of device.”35  If a person wanted their
work to be afforded copyright protection or be deemed copyright-
able, the work needs to be (1) a fixed tangible medium and (2) an
original work of authorship.36  There has been great debate about
whether tattoos meet the requirements to be copyrightable subject
matter.37  In order to understand this debate, it is important to pro-
vide a detailed outline of both requirements first.38
The Copyright Act first requires that for a work to be copy-
rightable subject matter, it must be “fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.”39  For a work to be “fixed,” it must be embedded for
32. For a discussion about the process used to decide who owns the copyright
to tattoos, see infra notes 60–94 and accompanying text. R
33. For a discussion about tattoo artists’ exclusive rights, examples of tattoo
artists enforcing their rights, and the significance of the settlements of those cases,
see infra notes 95–133 and accompanying text. R
34. For a discussion about defenses tattoo bearers and alleged third-party in-
fringers may use to refute why their alleged conduct is not copyright infringement,
see infra notes 134–184 and accompanying text. R
35. 17 U.S.C § 102(a).
36. See Yolanda M. King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos,
92 OR. L. REV. 129, 132 (2013) [hereinafter King 1] (citing § 102(a)) (noting re-
quirements for work to considered copyrightable subject matter are for work to be
one of original authorship in fixed tangible medium).
37. See, e.g., Commander, supra note 15, at 1954 (“The only realistic challenge R
to whether tattoos deserve the label of copyrightable subject matter involves their
fixed nature, and whether skin qualifies as a tangible medium of expression.”).
38. For a detailed discussion about the requirements to be considered copy-
rightable subject matter, see infra notes 39–59 and accompanying text. R
39. § 102(a).
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“more than a transitory duration.”40  The purpose of the fixation
requirement is to pinpoint when the work existed to determine
whether it can be afforded copyright protection.41  Therefore, even
if the duration of a work is temporary, it satisfies the fixation re-
quirement.42  An argument supporting why contemporaneously-
placed and preliminarily-sketched tattoos meet the fixed require-
ment is that the work in which the medium is fixed is unessential to
the analysis of fixation because the Copyright Act’s language in-
tended to cover an extensive range of mediums.43  However, some
disagree and argue skin is unable to be fixed because it is constantly
changing with time; therefore, contemporaneously-placed and pre-
liminarily-sketched tattoos are not copyrightable.44  Scholars that
prefer not to include the medium of expression into the fixation
analysis rebut the counterargument by highlighting that tattoos do
have a permanent quality to them, which easily satisfies the “more
than transitory duration” prong in the fixation analysis.45
The second requirement that must be met for a work to be
eligible for copyright protection is that it be “original.”46 Feist Publi-
cations v. Rural Telephone Service Co.47 set forth a two-prong test to
use when determining whether a work is original.48  First, the work
must be “independently created by the author.”49  Second, the work
40. Minahan, supra note 20, at 1716 n.22 (quoting § 101).  Further, “the fixa- R
tion requirement may be satisfied even if the fixation is temporary.” Id. at 1717
(citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir.
1993)).
41. See id. at 1716 (“The primary function of the fixation requirement is to
establish the point in time at which a work exists that may be eligible for copyright
protection.”).
42. See id. at 1717 (citing Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121,
129 (2d Cir. 2008)).  In Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit stated that “an embodi-
ment is fixed unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleeting that it cannot be
copied.” 536 F.3d at 127 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
43. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1717 (“The medium in which the work is R
fixed is irrelevant to the analysis of fixation, as the Copyright Act was intended to
encompass a broad scope of mediums of expression from paint on canvass to those
mediums that require assistance of technology to enable human perception.”).
44. See, e.g., Commander, supra note 15, at 1954 (“As skin ages, stretches, R
shrinks, burns, and varies pigments, a tattoo on that changing skin morphs as well,
calling into question whether a tattoo can ever be fixed.”).
45. See id. at 1954 (“Tattoos, however, ultimately possess a rather permanent
quality . . . skin can most certainly serve as a tangible medium of expression.”).
46. § 102(a).
47. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
48. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1717–18 (citing Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at R
345).
49. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345 (“Original, as the term is used in copyright,
means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works).”).
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must possess a “modicum of creativity.”50  To be independently cre-
ated, the author must not have copied from another person’s
work.51  For example, two authors who create the same work of ex-
pression without copying the other will meet the “independent cre-
ation” prong of the test.52  The “modicum of creativity” standard is
a fairly low creativity standard to meet.53  Tattoos are able to fulfill
the originality requirement without difficulty because most tattoo
artists create and develop tattoos independently, and modicum of
creativity is such a low threshold to meet that the simplest tattoo
can surpass the threshold with ease.54  Within the originality re-
quirement, a work must also be a “work[ ] of authorship.”55  To be
a work of authorship, the work must be created by an author and
fall under one of the listed categories under Section 102 of the
Copyright Act.56  The Act never defines what ‘author’ is, but it is
generally understood to be the creator of the work.57  Section 102
lists eight items that are considered works of authorship.58  There
50. Id.  This requires that the work “possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity.” Id.
51. See id. (explaining how author must not have copied another person’s
work for their work to be considered original).
52. See id. at 345–36 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be orig-
inal even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortui-
tous, not the result of copying.  To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant
of the other, compose identical poems.  Neither work is novel, yet both are origi-
nal and, hence, copyrightable.”).
53. See id. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvi-
ous’ it might be.”); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1718 (“The Feist standard presents a R
relatively low hurdle for copyrightability.”).
54. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1727 (“Undoubtedly, in many circum- R
stances, a tattoo will consists of a tattoo artist’s independently created expression
that possesses the necessary creativity.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, for
example when a tattoo consists of words or common geometric shapes such as a
heart or clover, it is likely that the work would not have been independently cre-
ated by the tattoo artist and would not meet the minimum requirements for crea-
tive expression.”).
55. § 102(a); see Cummings, supra note 13, at 286 (quoting § 102(a)) (“In ad- R
dition to being original, a work must be a ‘work of authorship’ to be
copyrightable.”).
56. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 286 (citing § 102) (explaining two prongs R
work needs to fulfill to be considered work of authorship).
57. See id. (“The term ‘author’ is left completely undefined in the Act.  This
may be because ‘author’ is a relatively straightforward concept, and the actions of
the author are more crucial to understanding the law.”).
58. § 102(a)(1)–(8); see Cummings, supra note 13, at 286 (“It is clear based on R
the legislative intent that these eight categories were not intended to be exhaustive
and that Congress aimed to create a flexible standard.”).  The list of categories
includes, but is not limited to: “(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
8
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have been arguments made that tattoos fall under “pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works” and “architectural works.”59
B. Determining Copyright Ownership: Tattoo Artist or Client?
After determining whether a work is copyrightable subject mat-
ter, the next step is to identify who owns the work because the indi-
vidual that owns the work is entitled to enforce copyright
protection.60  Section 201 of the Copyright Act states that
“[c]opyright in a work protected under this title vests in the author
or authors of the work.”61  The Act outlines three forms of author-
ship: sole authorship, joint authorship, and works-for-hire.62  Each
type of authorship has different implications regarding ownership
of work.63  Prior to dissecting the various authorships, it is impor-
tant to distinguish authorship versus ownership.64
The definitions of authorship and ownership can be regularly
intertwined depending on the medium the work is fixed on.65  As-
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.” § 102(a)(1)–(8).
59. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 296–97 (quoting § 102(a)(5), (8)) (“It R
also appears that a tattoo could easily meet this requirement set by § 102(a).  This
Section of the Act states that ‘works of authorship include the following categories
. . . (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”). But see Matthew W. Parker, That
Old Familiar Sting: Tattoos, Publicity, and Copyright, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 762 (2016) (arguing that tattoos can receive protection under Architec-
tural Works Copyright Act).
60. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1718 (“Once a work has been determined R
to be copyrightable, it is necessary to identify the proper owner of the copyright
who will possess the rights conferred by the copyright statute.”).
61. § 201(a); see also Minahan, supra note 20, at 1718 (“Section 201(a) pro- R
vides that initial ownership of the copyright in a protected work vests in the author
or authors of the work.”).
62. See § 201 (discussing different forms of copyright ownership). See also
King 2, supra note 7, at 35 (quoting JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL R
INFORMATION ECONOMY 116 (3d ed. 2010)) (stating that there are “three kinds of
authorship: sole authorship, joint or co-authorship, and employer authorship of
‘works made for hire’”); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1718–20 (discussing sole and R
joint authorship and works made-for-hire).
63. See King 1, supra note 36, at 155 (“Therefore, the classification of a work of R
authorship is integral to the determination of the exclusive rights of the owner of
the copyright in that work of authorship.”); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1718 R
(“Once a work has been determined to be copyrightable, it is necessary to identify
the proper owner of the copyright who will possess the rights conferred by the
copyright statute.”).
64. For further discussion about the difference between authorship and own-
ership, see infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. R
65. See King 2, supra note 7, at 35 (“Ownership and authorship become con- R
flated in the context of tattoos because of the uniqueness of the medium on which
the work is affixed.”).
9
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suming that contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched
tattoos are copyrightable,  it is vital to note that a person can own a
tattoo, but not own the copyright in the tattoo.66  For example, for
a preliminarily-sketched tattoo, the process involves a premade de-
sign that later becomes a tattoo that is placed on a person’s body.67
In this example, there is an author of the tattoo, who owns the cop-
yright in the design, and there is the owner of the embodiment of
the work who physically possesses the tattoo.68  This bifurcation
causes much confusion to the answer to “who is the owner of the
copyright in the tattoo?”69  Delineating the various forms of author-
ship will aid in answering said question.70
1. Sole Authorship and Joint Authorship
Sole authorship is when one person independently created a
work.71  Copyright protection is only extended to “works that are
‘representatives of [the] original intellectual conceptions of the au-
thor.’”72  When a work is developed from the “original intellectual
conceptions” of one person, that individual is the sole author—no
matter how many individuals were involved to create the work.73
66. See id. (“The author of the tattoo owns the copyright in it; however, the
owner of the copyright may not be the person whose body is adorned to the tattoo.
Ownership of the copyright is distinct from ownership of the tattoo itself.”).
67. For further discussion about preliminarily-sketched tattoos see supra notes
20–24 and accompanying text. R
68. See id. (explaining how owner of copyright in work and owner of physical
embodiment of work can be two different people).
69. Id.; see id. at 35–36 (“For tattoos, the owner of the physical object is the
person to whose skin the tattoo is affixed.  However, is this person also the author
of the tattoo art, and therefore, the owner of the copyright in the tattoo?  Or could
the copyright owner be another party-the tattoo artists, the tattoo parlor owner, or
other parties who may have a copyright interest in the drawing or other material
used to create the tattoo?  Or in some cases, are the tattoo artist and his customer
joint authors of the tattoo?”).
70. For a discussion about sole authorship, joint authorship, and works made-
for-hire, see infra notes 71–94 and accompanying text. R
71. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1718–19 (explaining concept of “sole au- R
thorship” of work).
72. Id. at 1719 (alteration in original) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).  Minahan elaborates on sole authorship as
follows:
Copyright protection subsists in works that are ‘representatives of [the]
original intellectual conceptions of the author.’  Even if the efforts of nu-
merous people are utilized to produce a work, a work may only have one
author who was the single person to whom the ‘original intellectual con-
ceptions’ of the work may be attributed.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
73. Id. (quoting Sarony, 11 U.S. at 58).
10
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Joint authorship is when “two or more authors with the inten-
tion that their contributions merged into inseparable or interde-
pendent parts of a unitary whole.”74  The key component in
figuring out whether a work is one of joint ownership is the intent
behind the authors.75  If two parties do not have the intention that
their contributions are to become an indivisible whole, there is no
joint authorship in the work, and no joint ownership in the copy-
right.76  There are lower chances that a tattoo would be of joint
authorship because most clients rely on a tattoo artist to indepen-
dently create a unique tattoo for the client.77
2. Works Made-For-Hire
When an individual is hired to make a work or given a specific
task to create a work during their employment at a company, it is a
work-for-hire situation.78  Employee-created works and indepen-
dent contractor-created works are two subdivisions within the work-
for-hire category.79  A work is employee-created when it is “pre-
pared by the employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment.”80  The Supreme Court’s decision in Community for Creative
74. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
75. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1974 (explaining why there is heavy R
emphasis on intent in proving joint authorship); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1719 R
(discussing importance of intent to be co-authors).
76. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1974 (noting importance of intent R
when assessing whether joint authorship applies to work); Minahan, supra note 20, R
at 1719 (stating that when courts attempt to establish intent at joint authorship,
they have considered, among other factors, “the delegation of decision-making au-
thority, how the parties billed or credited themselves with respect to the work, and
the content of written contracts”).
77. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1974 (detailing why joint authorship R
would most likely not apply to tattoo).
78. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 (citing § 101) (discussing works made- R
for-hire).  The Copyright Act defines a work made for hire as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compila-
tion, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as
an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made-for-hire.
§ 101.  For further discussion about works made-for-hire categories, see infra notes
79–94 and accompanying text. R
79. See King 2, supra note 7, at 41 (defining two works made-for-hire catego- R
ries); see also infra notes 80–91 and accompanying text. R
80. King 2, supra note 7, at 41 (quoting § 101); see also Commander, supra R
note 15, at 1969 (“A work for hire ‘is a work prepared by an employee within the R
scope of his or her employment, or a work specially ordered or commissioned to
fit within a list of nine categories that treat the tattooer as an independent contrac-
tor.’”) (quoting Alexa L. Nicko, Getting Down to (Tattoo) Business: Copyright Norms
11
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Non-Violence v. Reid81 concluded that agency common law meaning
should be applied to the phrase “a work prepared by an employee
under the scope of his or her employment.”82  The Court examined
the hired party’s “right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished” to determine whether the hired party
is categorized an employee under the common law of agency.83
The Court provided several factors to examine when assessing a
hired party’s status as an employee.84  Applying the common law
understanding of “employee” to tattoo artist, it is unlikely that a
“work-for-hire” status would be given to a tattoo artist because it is
hard to apply such relationship to a service provider and a client.85
The second subset of works made-for-hire is independent con-
tractor-created works.86  Independent contractor-created works are
produced when an entity or person “specially ordered or commis-
sioned a work.”87  There are two steps that must be satisfied to meet
categorized as such.88  First, the work that is commissioned must be
and Speech Protections for Tattooing, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV.183, 204
(2013)).
81. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
82. King 2, supra note 7, at 44 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. R
at 738); see Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, R
490 U.S. at 751–52) (discussing how Supreme Court interpreted term “employee”
in Copyright Act).
83. Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 n.49 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Vio- R
lence, 490 U.S. at 751); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751 (“In
determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law
of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished.”).
84. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 n.49 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non- R
Violence, 490 U.S. at 751–52). The Supreme Court listed the factors as follows:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of em-
ployee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751–52.
85. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 (noting how tattoo artist would be R
defined as employee under Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence because most of factors
would weigh against being categorized as employee under agency common law).
86. See King 2, supra note 7, at 41 (defining independent contractor-created R
works).
87. Id. (quoting § 101).
88. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 (citing § 101) (“First, the purpose of R
the work must be for use as a contribution to a collective work that falls within one
of the categories enumerated in §101.  To satisfy the second requirement, the par-
ties must expressly agree that the work will be considered a ‘work made for
hire.’”); see also King 2, supra note 7, at 46 (“Therefore, in order to qualify as an R
12
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one of the options listed in Section 101 of the Copyright Act and be
a contribution to a larger collective body of work.89  Second, the
hired contractor and the person or group that commissioned the
work must explicitly agree that the work will be identified as a “work
made-for-hire.”90  Applying these steps to the process of creating a
tattoo, it would be burdensome to prove that a tattoo is a part of a
larger collective body of work because, generally, a tattoo would not
be considered a part of a “collective work”—which is defined as “a
work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and inde-
pendent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective
whole.”91
In sum, if contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-
sketched tattoos are copyrightable, most tattoo artists will claim that
they are the sole authors of their tattoos and own the copyright to
those works.92  A tattoo artist’s client would face an uphill battle
supporting their argument that the tattoo artist and client should
be considered joint authors because joint authorship requires in-
tent by both parties to unify their contributions.93  It is even more
difficult for a client to establish that there was some form of a work-
for-hire relationship because the client lacks the authority under
agency law for a tattooist to be categorized as an employee, and
tattoos would probably not be deemed part of a collective work, and
independent contractor work, the work must fall into one of nine enumerated
categories.  In addition, ‘the parties [must] expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.’”) (quot-
ing § 101).
89. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1720 (stating first requirement). R
90. See id. (quoting § 101) (noting how parties must expressly agree that work
is a “work made-for-hire” for status to apply).
91. See King 2, supra note 7, at 46–47 (stating it would be difficult to prove R
that tattoo is “contribution to a collective body of work, and that “absent this classi-
fication, tattoos would not fall within one of the independent contractor categories
of works”); § 101. See also Minahan, supra note 20, at 1729–30 (“[T]he tattoo must R
be for use as a contribution to a collective work and the tattoo artist and client
must agree that the tattoo is a ‘work made for hire.’  This prong will likely not be
satisfied since a tattoo is generally not intended to be incorporated into a collective
work.”).
92. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1730 (“A tattoo is unlikely to be a ‘joint R
work’ since the client probably could not be found to have made an independently
copyrightable contribution to the creation of the tattoo.  It is possible that the
tattoo artist and the client could both intend to be coauthors of the tattoos; how-
ever, it is more likely that the tattoo artist would view himself or herself as the sole
author of the work.”).
93. See id. (explaining why tattoo artists are more likely to be viewed as sole
authors instead of as joint authors with their clients).
13
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would fail to satisfy one of the prongs for the independent contrac-
tor test.94
C. Tatted-up Celebrities and the Tattoo Artists That
Call the Shots
Once it is established whether the work is copyrightable and
who is the author of the work, the next logical question is which
individual or group owns the copyright to the work.95  Assuming
that contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched tattoos
are copyrightable and tattooist are the authors of the tattoos, it
must be decided whether the tattooist or the celebrity patron owns
the copyright to the tattoo.96  Usually the author of a work is the
owner of the copyright of the work, but not always.97  In Section B,
an example of an individual being an author of a work and not the
owner of the copyright, would be a work-for-hire situation.98  The
person that owns the copyright to a work holds specific rights.99
The Copyright Act states that the owner of the copyright has the
exclusive “right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare de-
rivative works based on the copyrighted work, the right to distribute
copies of the copyrighted work, and the right to publicly display the
94. See id. at 1729 (“First, since a tattoo artist is not likely to be found to be the
employee of his or her client under the common law agency standard promul-
gated by Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the first possibility of qual-
ifying under the doctrine does not apply.  Second, for a tattoo artist to qualify as an
independent contract under the second option of the ‘work made for hire’ doc-
trine, the tattoo must be for use as a contribution to a collective work and the
tattoo artist and client must agree that the tattoo is a work made for hire.’  This
prong will likely not be satisfied since a tattoo is generally not intended to be incor-
porated into a collective work.”).
95. See King 2, supra note 7, at 36 (“In order to resolve questions regarding R
ownership of a tattoo copyright, one must first determine the author of the copy-
rightable work.”); see also § 201 (“Copyright in a work protected under this title
vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”).
96. For further discussion about about the difference between ownership and
authorship, see supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. R
97. For further discussion about why an author can be the owner of a copy-
right, and the difference between authorship and ownership, see supra notes
64–70 and accompanying text. R
98. For further discussion about work-for-hire and ownership of copyright,
see supra notes 78–92 and accompanying text. R
99. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1955 (“The owner of a copyright pos- R
sesses certain exclusive rights.”); see also § 106  (“The owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 1) to
reproduce the copyrighted copies . . . 2) to prepare derivative works . . . 3) to
distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 4) . . . to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; 5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 6) . . . to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”).
14
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copyrighted work.”100  The copyright owner has the right to make
copies of their own work.101  Therefore, it is arguable that “recreat-
ing the original tattoo in a digital format explicitly creates a deriva-
tive version of the original work, violating the artist’s exclusive right
to all derivative works.  Finally, and most controversially, whenever,
the recipient of the tattoo appears in public, he violates the artist’s
right to publicly display the copyrighted work.”102  More and more
tattoo artists are beginning to enforce their copyrights against com-
panies and individuals that use tattoos they created without receiv-
ing permission.103  All of the cases settled and did not have the
chance to address whether copyright should be extended to
tattoos.104
1. Mike Tyson
In Whitmill v. Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc.,105 tattoo artist,
Victor Whitmill, filed a suit against Warner Brothers for copyright
infringement alleging that Warner Brothers copied, distributed,
displayed, and made an unauthorized derivative work for featuring
the tattoo he created for Tyson on advertisements without his per-
mission.106  Whitmill freehand-tattooed Mike Tyson’s iconic face
tattoo.107  Before the case settled, Judge Catherine D. Perry of the
100. Commander, supra note 15, at 1955 (citing § 106); see also King 2, supra R
note 7, at 33 (“Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides several exclusive R
rights to the copyright owner of a work. The copyright owner has the exclusive
right to, inter alia, reproduce, distribute, display, and create derivatives of the
copyrighted work.”).
101. See § 106 (stating copyright owner has rights “to reproduce the copy-
righted copies . . . to prepare derivative works.”).
102. Commander, supra note 15, at 1955–56 (citing § 102). R
103. See Etter, supra note 13 (recounting recent copyright infringement R
claims filed by tattoo artists).
104. See Elie, supra note 8 (“In the past ten years, a handful of tattoo artists R
have begun asserting their rights, only to discover that the legal field has never
officially defined to which rights tattoo artists are entitled.  Starting in 2005 when
artist Matthew Reed sued Nike over a commercial featuring a tattoo he created on
NBA star Rasheed Wallace’s arm, a handful of artists have filed complaints for
copyright infringement.  Yet all of these claims have settled out of court.”) (cita-
tion omitted).
105. No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
106. See Complaint at 1, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011)
(summarizing Whitmill’s copyright infringement claim against Warner Brothers
Entertainment). See generally Cummings, supra note 13, at 294 (“On April 28, 2011, R
S. Victor Whitmill filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri against Warner Brothers.  This complaint, alleging copyright in-
fringement under the Copyright Act.”); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1724–25 R
(discussing Whitmill).
107. See Complaint at 5, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-00752 (detailing when Whitmill
tattooed Mike Tyson); see also Cummings, supra note 13, at 294 (“In February 2003, R
15
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Eastern District of Missouri made comments during the preliminary
hearings that weigh in favor of giving tattoos copyright protec-
tion.108  She mentioned that Whitmill was not restricting how Mike
Tyson used his face or how or when he should be able to change
the tattoo, only that the tattoo can be copyrighted.109
2. Rasheed Wallace
Tattoo artist, Matthew Reed, filed a suit against Nike, Inc.,
Rasheed Wallace, and advertising agency, Weiden + Kennedy, for
copyright infringement in Reed v. Nike, Inc.110  Wallace asked Reed
to create an Egyptian-style tattoo that would cover his upper arm.111
Reed later saw an advertisement that included Wallace, which he
did not mind, but he took issue with how the tattoo was used.112
The advertisement heavily incorporated the tattoo and detailed the
Whitmill created and applied an ‘original and distinctive’ tattoo around the outer
portion of the left eye of former world champion heavyweight boxer Mike Ty-
son.”); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1730 (“In 2003, Whitmill tattooed an ‘original R
and distinctive’ design on the left side of Mike Tyson’s face.”).
108. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1962 (citing Transcript of Hearing on R
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo.
June 21, 2011)) (stating how Judge Perry believes Whitmill has credible claim on
merits).
109. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3,
Whitmill No. 4:11-CV-00752 (“Of course tattoos can be copyrighted.  I do not think
there is any reasonable dispute about that.  They are not copyrighting Mr. Tyson’s
face, or restricting Mr. Tyson’s use of his own face . . . or saying that someone who
has a tattoo can’t remove the tattoo or change it, but the tattoo itself and the
design itself can be copyrighted, and I think it’s entirely consistent with the copy-
right law.”).
110. No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. 2005); see Complaint at 12–15, Reed, 2005 WL
1182840 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2005) (summarizing how Reed tattooed Wallace and is
suing Wallace, Nike, and Weiden + Kennedy). See also King 1, supra note 36, at R
142–45 (discussing Reed); Commander, supra note 15, at 1956–60 (discussing R
Reed); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1722–24 (discussing Reed). R
111. See Complaint at 10, Reed, 2005 WL 1182840 (noting how Reed made
sketch prior to tattooing Wallace); see also Commander, supra note 15, at 1956 R
(“After finalizing the design, Reed created the stencil that would help transfer the
agreed upon drawing onto Wallace’s skin.”); Meredith Hatic, Comment, Who Owns
Your Body Art?: The Copyright and Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 396, 418 (2012) (“In a second meeting, Wallace
proposed changes to the sketch Reed had drawn and, over the course of three
sessions, Reed applied the tattoo to Wallace.”).
112. See Complaint at 12–15, Reed, 2005 WL 1182840 (“During the spring of
2004, Mr. Reed became aware that the tattoo he had applied to Mr. Wallace’s arm
was being featured as part of an advertising campaign including a commercial for
Nike highlighting Mr. Wallace.  That commercial, which was broadcast on televi-
sion and over the Internet, features the tattoo filling the screen in a close up, then
the tattoo and the process of its creation are simulated by a computerized method
with a voice over by Mr. Wallace describing the tattoo and its meaning.”).
16
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tattoos meaning.113  After Reed viewed the commercial, he filed for
copyright registration and filed a suit for copyright infringement.114
Reed alleged that Nike and Weiden + Kennedy infringed on his
copying, reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and public display
rights and that Wallace committed contributory infringement.115
The case settled between the parties before going to trial.116
3. Carolos Condit
Escobedo v. THQ, Inc.,117 dealt with tattoo artist Christopher Es-
cobedo, who sued video game developer THQ for making a digital
replication of the lion tattoo he created for Carolos Condit without
his permission.118  THQ sold UFC Undisputed 3, a fighting video
game that featured Condit’s character.119  The character included a
reproduction of Condit’s tattoo and the details of the tattoo were
clearly seen because the tattoo was significantly displayed.120  Esco-
bedo made a stencil of the tattoo prior to tattooing it on Condit,
113. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1958 (citing Rasheed Wallace – Nike R
Commercial, YOUTUBE (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXPhG
f8Bi74 [https://perma.cc/97TJ-XR4G] (“In the advertisement Wallace describes
both tattoos, and their meaning, as a simulated version of the creation process fills
them in on his arms.”); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1723 (“The commercial in- R
cluded a full-screen depiction of the Wallace tattoo, a computerized recreation of
the tattoo, and a voiceover by Wallace ‘describing the tattoo and its meaning.’”).
114. See King 1, supra note 36, at 143 (“After Reed saw the advertisement, he R
filed an application to register copyrights for the drawings related to the tattoo.”);
Minahan, supra note 20, at 1723 (describing when Reed filed copyright registration R
and lawsuit).
115. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1958 (“Reed accused Nike of infring- R
ing on his copyright by reproducing, distributing, adapting, and publicly display-
ing his original design without his consent, permission, or authority.”); see also
Minahan, supra note 20, at 1723 (citing Complaint at 4, Reed, 2005 WL 1182840) R
(summarizing Reed’s allegations).
116. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1724 (noting how parties settled prior R
going to trial).
117. No. 2:12-CV-02470 (D. Ariz. 2012).
118. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1725 (citing Complaint at 1–2, Escobedo, R
2012 WL 5815742 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2012)) (stating who plaintiff and defendant
are); see also Eriq Gardner, Tattoo Artist Looks to Show Value of Copyright Claim Against
Videogame Publisher, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 10, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.hol-
lywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/tattoo-artist-looks-show-value-625509 [https://perma
.cc/8VQA-R56B] (summarizing Escobedo’s copyright infringement claim against
THQ).
119. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1726 (citing Complaint at 3, Escobedo, 2012 R
WL 5815742) (stating video game “included a computer-generated character rep-
resenting Condit that could be selected for use during the gameplay–the Condit
character featured a reproduction of the Condit tattoo”).
120. See id. (citing Complaint at 3–4, Escobedo, 2012 WL 5815742) (describing
how the tattoo was featured on Undisputed 3).
17
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and later registered the sketch with the Copyright Office.121  He
never included Condit in the suit because he granted Condit an
implied license to display the tattoo.122  The case was later dis-
missed for failure to prosecute.123
4. Ricky Williams
Scott Allen tattooed football player, Ricky Williams, on his up-
per arm.124  Allen later saw the tattoo displayed on various EA
Sports video games, including NFL Street, Madden NFL 10, and Mad-
den NFL 11, and Allen sued EA Sports for violating his right to copy,
reproduce, distribute, publically display, and make derivate
works.125  In addition, Allen “sued Williams for contributory in-
fringement of his copyright and exclusive rights” and “in the alter-
native, he sued Williams for an accounting of his share in the profit
from any use of the tattoo as a co-owner of the work.”126  Allen later
entered into a settlement with EA Sports and Williams.127
5. The Nexus of the Cases: Tying the Cases Together
The fact that all the previously mentioned cases settled pro-
vides credence to the belief that the defendants were concerned
121. See id. at 1725–26 (citing Complaint at 3–4, Escobedo, 2012 WL 5815742)
(“Prior to tattooing Condit, Escobedo first sketched the Condit tattoo on paper,
which became the basis for the subsequent tattoo.”); see also Copyright Registration
Number VA-1094-747, entitled “Lion Tattoo” (Feb. 24, 2014) (Escobedo’s Copy-
right Registration Number).
122. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1726 (citing Complaint at 3–4, Escobedo, R
2012 WL 5815742) (noting that Escobedo stated he gave Condit implied license).
123. See id. (citing Minute Entry, Escobedo, No. 2:12-CV-02470 (D. Ariz. Dec.
11, 2013)) (noting that case was later dismissed).
124. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1963 (citing Complaint at 2, Allen v. R
Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03172 (W.D. La. Dec. 31, 2012)) (“Ricky Williams vis-
ited Crybabies Tattoo, Allen’s place of business, and requested Allen to apply a
tattoo to his upper arm.”); see also Scott Flaherty, EA, Ex-NFL Star Face Copyright Suit
over Game Cover Tattoos, LAW 360 (Jan. 7, 2013, 1:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/404977/ea-ex-nfl-star-face-copyright-suit-over-game-cover-tattoos [https://
perma.cc/C6E5-2J94] (providing overview of copyright dispute between Allen,
Electronic Arts, and Williams).
125. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1963–64 (citing Complaint at 5, Allen, R
No. 5:12-CV-03172) (“Allen sued EA Sports for violating his exclusive rights and
specifically for copying, reproducing, distributing, making unauthorized derivative
work, and publicly displaying the copyrighted work.”).  Allen’s causes of action
were filed under Sections 106 and 501 of the Copyright Act. See id. at 1964 n.85
(citing Complaint at 6, 9, Allen, No. 5:12-CV-03172).
126. Id. at 1964 (citing Complaint at 6, 9, Allen, No. 5:12-CV-03172) (summa-
rizing Allen’s claim against Williams).
127. See id. (citing Order at 1, Allen, No. 5:12-CV-03172 (W.D. La. Apr. 9,
2013)) (“Allen ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with EA Sports and
Williams, just three and a half months after filing his complaint.”).
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that the tattoo artists had legitimate copyright claims.128  On the
other hand, the defendants may have decided that settling the cases
was just the most efficient way to handle their respective busi-
ness.129  However, it is important to highlight that some of the tat-
toos were drawn or stenciled prior to the design being tattooed on
the celebrity and others were not.130  The distinction between con-
temporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched tattoos will have
an influential impact on the analysis on whether a tattoo should
receive copyright protection.131  Another distinction is that some
tattoo artist alleged that the bearers of the tattoos were contributory
infringers, which deals with whether there is an implied license
when a tattoo artist tattoos a celebrity customer.132  Finally, a major-
ity of the tattoo artists took issue with a third party profiting off of
their work, bringing into question whether implied licenses extend
to third parties.133
D. Defenses Against Copyright Infringement of Tattoos
There are a series of defenses that may be used against tattoo
artists claiming copyright infringement on the premise that tattoos
are subject to copyright protection: (1) fair use, (2) tattoos cannot
be copies, (3) implied licenses, and (4) public policy concerns.134
128. See id. at 1965 (“The fact that all three major cases settled indicates at
least some fear on the part of the defendants that tattoo artists have legitimate
copyright infringement claims.”).
129. See id. (“Alternatively all of the defendants wanted to avoid the nuisance
of ongoing litigation and the bad publicity associated with the trial, recognized
litigation as a cost of doing business, and could afford to throw settlement money
at  their copyright problems without any negative effect on their business.”).
130. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1728 (“For a more custom or unique tat- R
too, a client might present the tattoo artist with his or her ideas for a tattoo then
work with the tattoo artist to develop a preliminary drawing which will become the
basis for the subsequent tattoo.  In contrast, for those more trusting clients, a tat-
too artist may choose to create a work contemporaneously with the tattooing of the
client, without basing the tattoo on any prior work.”).
131. For further discussion about how preliminarily-sketched and contempo-
raneously-placed tattoos receive different analyses regarding whether copyright ex-
tension should be extended, see infra notes 200–216 and accompanying text. R
132. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1726 (“In his complaint, Escobedo alleged R
that he had granted Condit an implied license to display the Condit tattoo on his
body.”); but see Commander, supra note 15, at 1958 (“Reed also sued Wallace on R
two separate counts: first for contributory infringement.”).
133. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1956–64 (discussing how tattoo artists R
sued third parties for copyright infringement for featuring the tattoos without tat-
tooist’s consent); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1722–26 (discussing same). R
134. See, e.g., King 2, supra note 7, at 63–67 (discussing implied licenses); R
Commander, supra note 15, at 1965–69 (discussing fair use); Hatic, supra note 111, R
at 420 (discussing public policy concerns); Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732–36 R
(discussing whether tattoos are copies).  For further discussion about defenses al-
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The fair use and implied licenses defenses argue that the alleged
infringing conduct falls under an exception and does not constitute
copyright infringement.135  The tattoos cannot be copies and pub-
lic policy defenses argue that tattoos should not be afforded the
copyright protection.136  The tattoos are not copies defense is based
on the rationality that Congress did not intend for tattoos to be a
tangible medium that should be afforded protection.137  Public pol-
icy concerns focus on how an individual’s constitutional right to not
be enslaved would be stripped if copyright protection is extended
to tattoos, and, to prevent such injustices, copyright protection
should not be expanded to include tattoos.138
1. Fair Use
The Copyright Act states that the fair use of a copyrighted work
applies when the purpose of the use is “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship or research.”139  If a work is used for fair use, then the
use is not considered a violation of the Copyright Act.140  The Copy-
right Act provides additional factors to consider when analyzing
leged infringers can use to argue why they did not commit copyright infringement,
see infra notes 134–184 and accompanying text. R
135. See More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 107) https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/
XXX7-BRMX] (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (“Fair use is a legal doctrine that pro-
motes freedom of expression by permitting the unlicensed use of copyright-pro-
tected works in certain circumstances.  Section 107 of the Copyright Act  provides
the statutory framework for determining whether something is a fair use and iden-
tifies certain types of uses—such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research—as examples of activities that may qualify as fair use.”);
see also Implied Copyright Licenses: A Last Resort for Unwritten Agreements, ACUMEN L.
GROUP (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html
[https://perma.cc/7NUM-QUNW] (“Ultimately, an implied license provides the
licensee (the business owner in our scenario) some nonexclusive rights to use the
copyrighted work to the extent that the copyright author would have allowed had
the parties initially negotiated and signed an agreement.”).
136. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1735 (“Since, under the foregoing inter- R
pretation of the Copyright Act, the human body is not an ‘object,’” it would not
qualify as a ‘copy’ in which a work can be fixed.  When a tattoo is created contem-
poraneously with its application to human skin, the fixation requirement cannot
be satisfied because, per the requirements of the Copyright Act, there is no resul-
tant copy of the work.”).
137. See id. (arguing that Congress did not intend for human body to be con-
sidered as an “object” under definition of “copies,” and, therefore, tattoos cannot
meet requirements under statutory language to receive copyright protection).
138. For further discussion about how tattoo clients will have their constitu-
tional rights stripped from them if copyright protection is extended to tattoos, see
supra notes 173–184 and accompanying text. R
139. Commander, supra note 15, at 1966 (quoting § 107). R
140. See § 107 (detailing how fair use is not copyright infringement).
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whether use of a work is fair use: “(1) the purpose and character of
the use;” “(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in comparison of the copy-
righted work; and (4) the effect upon the use on the potential mar-
ket or value of the copyrighted work.”141  The ultimate goal of the
fair use doctrine is to allow “authors to draw upon preexisting
works for purposes of criticizing, disseminating news, teaching or
commentary in order to further Congress’s and the Copyright Act’s
goals of promoting science and the useful arts and stimulating crea-
tivity.”142  If tattoos are copyrightable, fair use is always an effective
defense as long as the use falls within one of the categories outlined
in the Copyright Act.143  This is also a limitation of the fair use de-
fense, it applies to a narrow category.144  For third parties, fair use
of a copyrighted tattoo would most likely entail using it in the form
of a parody or in news reporting.145  An example would be film-
makers directly copying a tattoo to develop a conversation by way of
criticizing and commenting on the tattoo.146
2. Tattoos Are Not Copies
There is a persuasive argument that tattoos cannot receive cop-
yright protection because human skin cannot fulfill the statutory
requirement to be defined as a copy under the Copyright Act.”147
The Copyright Act defines ‘copies’ as “material objects . . . in which
a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice.”148  To be considered fixed, a work must last for “more than a
transitory duration,” and the medium on which the work is placed
141. Commander, supra note 15, at 1966 (citing § 107). R
142. Hatic, supra note 111, at 409–10 (citing §107). R
143. § 107 (stating categories that fall under fair use).
144. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135 (“Courts evaluate fair use R
claims on a case-by-case basis, and the outcome of any given case depends on a
fact-specific inquiry.  This means that there is no formula to ensure that a predeter-
mined percentage or amount of a work—or specific number of words, lines, pages,
copies—may be used without permission.”).
145. See Hatic, supra note 111, at 410 (“Fair use of a copyrighted tattoo is most R
likely to occur in the form of parody or in the course of news reporting.”).
146. See id. (“For instance, in television shows such as Saturday Night Live, or
in comedic films . . . filmmakers might directly copy a well-known tattoo in order
to conjure up the original work and to comment on or criticize either the preexist-
ing work or the subject on which it appears.”).
147. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732 (“By defining ‘copies’ as ‘material R
objects,’ Congress likely did not intend to include human skin within the category
of mediums in which copyrightable work could be embodied.”).
148. Id. (quoting § 101).
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must be considered a copy under the Act.149  The human skin is not
a medium on which a work may be fixed because it is constantly
changing even though to the human eye a tattoo has a permanent
quality, and also because Congress probably did not consider
human skin a material object in which a work can be fixed when
drafting the statute.150  The strength of this argument is that it is
based solely on statutory interpretation of the plain language.151  If
a court were only to examine the plain language of the statute, it
would likely conclude that human skin is not a material object be-
cause it does not fall within the definition of ‘material objects.’152
However, if interpretation of the statute’s plain language is not the
only method to use to ascertain what words mean, then there is a
possibility that a judge may conclude that tattoos can be a copy if it
examines the statutory history and Congress’s intent.153
3. Implied Licenses
The Copyright Act specifies that transfers in ownership be
made in writing.154  However, a non-exclusive implied license need
not be in writing.155  A non-exclusive license “‘permits the use of a
copyrighted work in a particular manner’ and serves as an affirma-
149. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732 (citing § 101) (“To satisfy the ‘fixa- R
tion’ requirement for copyrightable subject matter, a work must be ‘embodied in a
copy,’ therefore, if there is no ‘copy’ of a work the fixation requirement cannot be
satisfied and the work is not copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright
Act.”).
150. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1954 (discussing changing of skin over R
time); see also Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732 (“By defining ‘copies’ as ‘material R
objects,’ Congress likely did not intend to include human skin within the category
of mediums in which copyrightable work could be embodied.”).
151. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1733 (“Examination of the copyright stat- R
ute as a whole also indicates that inclusion of the human body as a ‘copy’ would
require absurd interpretation of other provisions.”).
152. For further discussion about why human skin is not an intended medium
for a work to be fixed, see supra note 150 and accompanying text. R
153. See Katharine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting,
and Applying Statutes, GEO. U. L. CTR. (Apr. 2006), https://www.law.georgetown
.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/
upload/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3EKE-9GAK] (outlining various tools available when interpreting statutory
language).
154. See Craig P. Bloom, Comment, Hangover Effect: May I See Your Tattoo
Please?, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 459 (2013) (citing § 204) (“The Copy-
right Act requires that transfers of ownership be made in writing. A non-exclusive
license, however, is excluded from the writing requirement.”); see also King 2, supra
note 7, at 63 (“While the Copyright Act requires that a transfer of copyright owner- R
ship be in writing, there is no writing requirement for an implied nonexclusive
license.”).
155. See Bloom, supra note 154, at 459 (stating that non-exclusive license does R
not need be in writing).
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tive defense to copyright infringement.”156  It can be implied, and
the agreement be made via conduct.157  When using a non-exclu-
sive license defense, there are three questions to ask: “(1) whether a
copyright owner granted an implied license; (2) whether the use of
the copyrighted work was within the scope of the implied license;
and (3) whether the copyright owner revoked the implied license
prior to the infringing conduct.”158  There is much discourse as to
whether an implied license extends to third parties or remains just
with the person on whom the tattoo is adorned.159  Escobedo, who
tattooed Condit’s tattoo, granted an implied license to Condit but
sued THQ, Inc. because that license did not extend to the company
as a third party.160  A benefit of the non-exclusive license defense
for celebrities is that celebrities can argue that tattooists give an im-
plied license to display the tattoo, and no infringement occurs be-
cause of the license.161  However, a setback for third  parties is that
an implied license probably does not extend to third parties be-
cause a tattooist gives the implied license solely to the celebrity.162
156. See id. (quoting I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996))
(discussing what non-exclusive license entails).
157. See King 2, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing implied licenses).  “An implied R
license ‘may be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.’” Id. (quot-
ing Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990)).
158. Bloom, supra note 154, at 459. R
159. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted) (“Such an interpretation of a license accords with the policies
underlying enactment of the Copyright Act.  The legislative history reveals an
acute awareness of the need to delicately balance competing interests.  On the one
hand, there was a strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or compo-
sitions; at the same time, there was an awareness of the necessity of preserving the
rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate creativity.”); SQL Sols., Inc.
v. Oracle Corp, 1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Emus Records, 734
F.2d at 1334) (“The prohibition against transfer of patent licenses is longstanding
and frequently invoked. Emus Records court observed that a parallel prohibition
against the transfer of copyright licenses gave effect to the policy of protecting
creativity underlying enactment of the Copyright Act.”).
160. See King 2, supra note 7, at 66–67 (citing Bloom, supra note 154, at 468) R
(“However, while the scope of this license may encompass commercial use of the
work, particularly for clients who are athletes and celebrities, the license does not
cover commercial uses by third parties, or in instances like [Condit], a client’s
cooperation with third parties’ commercial use of a tattoo.”).
161. See King 3, supra note 18, at 445–46 (citing LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POL- R
LACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 22.32 (4th
ed. 2015)) (“Generally, state right-of-publicity laws allow a plaintiff to recover upon
a showing that an item of commerce associated with his or her identity has eco-
nomic value. Right-of-publicity laws have been extended to cover references to a
persona such as voice, name, photograph, likeness, signature phrase, and fictional
character.”).
162. See Understanding the Difference Between a Transfer and a License, DIGITAL
MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/understanding-difference-
between-transfer-and-license [https://perma.cc/BSG9-LSXW] (last visited Mar. 9,
23
Boozer: When the Ink Dries, Whose Tatt Is it Anyway? The Copyrightability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 24 30-JUL-18 12:35
298 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 275
4. Public Policy Concerns for Celebrity Tattoos
There are two predominate public policy arguments against
permitting tattoo artists of celebrities having copyrights to their
work: (1) a celebrity’s right of publicity and (2) a celebrity’s right to
autonomy over their body.163  These two arguments address con-
cerns such as: “What happens when a tattoo becomes ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with the celebrity’s persona?” and “Can a tattoo artist
deny a celebrity from certain projects if it highlights their work?”164
In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc.,165 Judge Je-
rome Frank “coined the term ‘right to publicity’ in an effort to dis-
tinguish it from the right of privacy.”166  In Haelan Laboratories,
Judge Frank concluded that prominent individuals should be per-
mitted to benefit financially when businesses use their personas,
and, if those individuals were not able to authorize the use of their
image in exchange for financial gain, it would cause damage.167 A
2017) (“When you give someone a non-exclusive license, you give the licensee per-
mission to exercise the right in question, but you also reserve the right to continue
exercising it yourself and to authorize others to do so . . . . The recipient of a non-
exclusive license may exercise the right or rights licensed, but MAY NOT: author-
ize others to exercise the right or rights licensed via transfer or license without
permission of the copyright owner; and sue for copyright infringement of the li-
censed right(s).”); see also Bloom, supra note 154, at 468 (“[I]t is evident that com- R
mercial use is permitted by a tattoo holder’s implied license in certain situations,
and never permitted by third parties.”).
163. See Hatic, supra note 111, at 420 (“In tattoo cases, because of the nature R
of the medium in which the copyrighted work is fixed, interests including the right
to publicity and the constitutional right to control one’s body must weigh more
heavily in determining whether infringement occurred.”).
164. For further discussion about right of publicity and tattoos becoming in-
tertwined with a celebrity’s persona, see infra notes 165–184 and accompanying R
text. See also King 2, supra 7, at 159. R
165. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
166. King 3, supra note 18, at 450 (quoting Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868). R
167. See id. at 450–51 (citing Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868).  In Haelan Labs,
Judge Frank famously noted:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the public-
ity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in
gross,’ i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything
else.  Whether it be labelled a ‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as
often elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.  This right might be called a
‘right of publicity.’  For it is common knowledge that many prominent
persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely de-
prived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways.
Id. at 450–51 (quoting Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868).
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celebrity’s right of publicity is infringed upon when an unautho-
rized use will damage the celebrity’s commercial value.168  A celeb-
rity’s identity or persona is how they make money, and personas can
include iconic marks, attire, and even tattoos.169  When the tattoos
become an identifier of the celebrity’s persona, the tattoo essen-
tially becomes the celebrity’s identity and is eligible for protection
under the right of publicity.170  A celebrity’s right of publicity
clashes with a tattooist’s claims of copyright because, theoretically, a
tattooist would be able to control how a celebrity uses the tattoo (a
celebrity’s identity) due to the vested copyrights in the tattoo.171  It
works against the purpose of the right of publicity because the
whole purpose is to enable celebrities to profit off of the use of
their personas, and permitting tattoo artists to have influence over
how and when a tattoo is used inhibits on a celebrity’s ability to
exercise their right.172
Another policy argument is that every individual has the funda-
mental right to not be enslaved.173  Enabling tattoo artists to decide
how a tattoo can be used on a person’s body curtails a person’s
168. See id. at 451 (“[T]he right of publicity protects against damage to the
commercial value of an individual’s identity.”); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:1 (4th ed. 2016) (“This
legal right is infringed by unpermitted use which will likely damage the commer-
cial value of this inherent right of human identity and which is not immunized by
principles of free speech and free press.  Infringement of the right of publicity is a
commercial tort, and a form of unfair competition.”).
169. See, e.g., Anjelica Oswald, Here Are 27 of the Most Iconic Celebrity Tattoos,
INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:55pm), http://www.thisisinsider.com/celebrity-iconic-
tattoos-inspiration-2017-9#adam-levine-has-a-huge-mermaid-holding-a-skull-tat-
tooed-on-his-back-11 [https://perma.cc/U4Q9-GKSV] (listing celebrities and tat-
toos they are known for).
170. See King 3, supra note 18, at 446 (“If a celebrity’s tattoo becomes indicia R
of that celebrity’s identity, then the tattoo is now a part of the protectable right of
publicity of that celebrity.  Thus, a tattoo is a rare instanced of a publicity right
born from copyrightable work.”).
171. See Parker, supra note 59, at 767 (“Under the current system a person has R
a copyrighted image on their body which may wholly belong to another person.
Because of that copyrighted image, the law allows that other person to have some
say in how the person uses their likeness . . . . Through the act of receiving an
original tattoo on their body, a celebrity has given away a piece of their right of
publicity to another party who not gets to dictate its use.  This runs counter to the
goals of the rights of publicity as well as a basic sense of equity.”).
172. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1731 (“Since Tyson is a celebrity/athlete R
who likely derives significant income from his appearances in person, on televi-
sion, and in films, forcing him to forego these public appearances could have a
significant impact on his ability to earn an income.”).
173. See, e.g., King 2, supra note 7, at 67–69 (discussing Thirteenth Amend- R
ment implications if tattoo artists hold copyrights of tattoos); Bloom, supra note
154, at 439–443 (discussing Thirteenth Amendment implications if tattoo artists R
hold copyrights of tattoos); see also U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall
25
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autonomy over their body.174  Extending copyright to a work that is
carried on the human body causes issues regarding slavery by al-
lowing the tattooist to have control over the celebrity.175  If copy-
right is not limited to traditional mediums, it will be difficult to
draw the line about what authority an owner of a copyright has over
a person’s body regarding the use of a tattoo.176  The Copyright Act
gives copyright owners the right to display their works.177  If copy-
right is extended to tattoos, tattoo artists will be able to prevent a
celebrity from making public appearances or even request that a
celebrity cover their tattoo.178  These are extreme examples of how
a copyright owner can wield the authority of the copyright to im-
pose when and where a celebrity can use the tattoo, thwarting a
celebrity’s autonomy.179
There are a few consequences that may occur if copyright pro-
tection is extended to tattoos.180  First, a tattoo artist might have the
right to compel a bearer of a tattoo to not remove the tattoo if the
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to its jurisdiction.”)
174. See Bloom, supra note 154, at 442–43 (stating that such situation would R
“result [in] control by tattoo, which some believe amounts to involuntary servitude or a
form of ownership in the body of another”); Cummings, supra note 13, at 309 R
(“[I]n a society which values individual freedoms and human rights above all else,
this potential harm to human rights could prove fatal when deciding whether or
not to extend copyright protection to tattoos.”).
175. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1979 (“Without a harsh deviation . . . R
‘copyright law thereby becomes the instrument to impose, almost literally, a badge
of involuntary servitude, akin to the mark which ranchers brand the cattle they
own’ onto the recipient of a tattoo.”). But see Bloom, supra note 154, at 442 (“It is R
unsettling to think that a copyright holder could dictate how another person may
display the tattoo on his body.  Nevertheless, this scenario does not amount to
involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Consequently, tattoos
remain copyrightable.”).
176. For further discussion about possible consequences if copyright protec-
tion is extended to tattoos, see infra notes 180–184 and accompanying text. R
177. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 309 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(5)) (stating R
Copyright Act “specifically confers upon a copyright holder affirmative display
rights”).  Section 106(5) of the Copyright Act states that “[t]he owner of copyright
under this tile has the exclusive right[ ] to . . . display [or authorize the display of]
the copyrighted work publicly.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting § 106(5)).
178. See id. at 310 (citing § 106(5)) (“The language of the Act seems to sug-
gest that the tattoo artist may legally prohibit that person from making the public
appearance, or at least compel her to cover up the portion of her body displaying
the tattoo.”).
179. See id. (describing power of tattoo copyright holder).  For further discus-
sion about the negative effect of extending copyright protection to tattoos, see
supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text and infra notes 180–184 and accompa- R
nying text.
180. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 308–09 (discussing consequences).  For R
further discussion about the consequences of allowing tattooist to receive exclusive
rights under the Copyright Act, see infra notes 181–183 and accompanying text. R
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tattoo gains notoriety.181  Second, a judge can order the tattoo
bearer to remove the tattoo if the bearer adds another tattoo to the
copyrighted work to make a large piece of work, which can be con-
sidered an unauthorized derivative work.182  Third, a bearer of
copyrighted tattoos will not have any legal protection against the
previously mentioned consequences.183  Ultimately, a person’s in-
terest to not be subject to a form of enslavement substantially out-
weighs reasons why copyright should be extended to tattoos.184
III. INK ON PAPER, NOT SKIN: WHY TATTOOS
ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE
Extending copyright protection to tattoos is not as straightfor-
ward as it may appear.185  The requirements to be copyrightable
subject matter have been previously discussed, and Section A of this
section reasons that, at a glance, tattoos do meet the requirements
181. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 308 (citing Declaration of David Nim- R
mer at ¶¶ 47–48., Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D.
Mo. May 20, 2011)) (“These scenarios and the human rights implications that stem
from them are a large part of what Professor Nimmer feared when he concluded
that copyright protection is inappropriate for the world of tattoos.  The core issue
here is that copyright protection effectively becomes a means for the control of a
person through an author’s ability to control what a person may permanently etch
or remove from her skin.”); see also Hatic, supra note 111, at 408–09 (“However, R
where a tattoo does qualify as such a work . . . could present additional conflicts
with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy.  Arguably, where a tattooed subject
decided to alter his tattoo, or perhaps even remove it, the artist (if he were the
owner) would have the right to prevent such a modification.  As with the enforce-
ment of an artist/owner’s right to public display, enforcing the right to attribution
and integrity could potentially conflict with the subject’s constitutional right to
control his own body.”).
182. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 308 (citing § 106(a)(3)(A)–(B)) (“The R
language of § 106A seems to suggest that a court could order the individual not to
remove the tattoo, or even order the individual to receive laser removal of altera-
tions or modifications made to it.”). But see Parker, supra note 59, at 775 (arguing R
that tattoo artists “have no right to demand or require that a person have an in-
fringing tattoo removed from their bodies by any means, owing to the cost and
pain of such a procedure, although they may offer economic incentives to entice
them to do so”).
183. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 309–10 (noting that bearers of tattoos R
will not be able to protect themselves from unlimited power copyright owners have
over tattoo adorned on their skin).
184. See id. at 307–08 (“While tattoo artist, and society in general, will benefit
from this very incentive for creation that they would receive as a part of copyright
extension, the inquiry is not this simple . . . . [T]he human form is far from a
traditional medium of expression, and extending the protections and rights that
the Copyright Act guarantees to authors creates a host of unique issues when a
human being is involved.  The potential between the rights of the author and the
basic human rights of the recipient is problematic to say the least.”).
185. See, e.g., id. at 308–11 (discussing issues associated with extending copy-
right protection to tattoos).
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and should receive copyright protection.186  However, an in-depth
examination of the Copyright Act and related cases supports the
proposal that copyright protection should only be extended to pre-
liminary drawings and not contemporaneously-placed and prelimi-
narily-sketched tattoos.187  Section B expounds on the significance
between preliminary drawings and contemporaneously-placed and
preliminarily-sketched tattoos, and why tattoos placed on the
human body cannot be categorized as a “copy.”188  Section C sum-
marizes public policy concerns that add supplementary support
about why tattoos cannot acquire copyright protection.189  Section
D outlines various defenses celebrity tattoo bearers and third par-
ties can present if tattoo artists of preliminary sketches claim that
they committed copyright infringement.190
A. Tattoos Are Eligible for Copyright Protection . . . Maybe
The Copyright Act requires a work to be an “original work[ ] of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” to receive
copyright protection under the statute.191  First, a tattoo can meet
the originality requirement.192  Tattoos are usually independently
created by the tattooist, satisfying one prong of the originality re-
quirement.193  Tattoos possess the necessary creative spark to pass
the low modicum of creativity threshold because it is an expression
of idea through a niche technique, tattooing, and the expression is
unique, satisfying the second prong of the originality
requirement.194
186. See supra notes 35–59 and accompanying text (discussing requirements R
for copyrightable subject matter); infra notes 191–199 and accompanying text (dis- R
cussing whether, on its face, tattoos meet the basic requirements to be copyright-
able subject matter); see also Cummings, supra note 13, at 311 (concluding “tattoos R
are fully capable of satisfying the Act’s requirements of originality, fixation, and
authorship”).
187. For further discussion about whether tattoos should be afforded copy-
right protection, see infra notes 191–252 and accompanying text. R
188. For further discussion about the difference between pre-sketched tattoos
and contemporaneous tattoos, see infra notes 200–216 and accompanying text. R
189. For further discussion about the policy concerns regarding extending
copyright protection to tattoos, see infra notes 217–221 and accompanying text. R
190. For further discussion about the defenses that can be used against copy-
right infringement claims for preliminary sketches, see infra notes 222–252 and R
accompanying text.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
192. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1727 (noting originality requirement). R
193. See id. (noting how tattoo is usually an “independently created
expression”).
194. See id. (“Undoubtedly, in many circumstances, a tattoo will consist of a
tattoo artist’s independently created expression that possesses the necessary crea-
tivity.”). But see id. (“On the opposite end of the spectrum, for example when a
28
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Next, is the fixation requirement.195  To be fixed, a work must
last “for a period of more than transitory duration” and there are
arguments for and against why tattoos are fixed.196  The argument
for why tattoos are fixed is, to the human eye, the work is perma-
nent because it cannot be removed from the body unless extreme
measures are taken.197  The argument against tattoos being fixed is
that the human skin is not permanent because it is constantly
changing as time moves forward, and even though to the human
eye the work is permanent, through a microscopic lens, the skin is
constantly changing.198  Judge Perry’s comments during the prelim-
inary injunction in Whitmill weighs in that tattoos are copyrightable
even though human skin is the medium on which tattoos are
fixed.199
B. The Difference Between Ink to Paper and Ink to Skin
However, despite Judge Perry’s conclusion, arguably the dis-
tinction between sketching a design on a traditional medium prior
to tattooing the design on a person and contemporaneously design-
ing and tattooing is vital to whether copyright will be afforded to a
work.200  The tattoo artists in Reed and Escobedo created sketches
prior to tattooing the design on their respective clients and later
registered their drawings.201  It is important to note that the artists
tattoo consists of words or common geometric shapes such as a heart or clover, it is
likely that the work would not have been independently created by the tattoo artist
and would not meet the minimum requirements for creative expression.”).
195. See id. (noting fixation requirement).
196. § 101.  For further discussion about the fixation requirements, see supra
notes 39–45 and accompanying text. R
197. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1717 (“The medium in which the work is R
fixed is irrelevant to the analysis of fixation, as the Copyright Act was intended to
encompass a broad scope of mediums of expression from paint on canvass to those
mediums that require assistance of technology to enable human perception.”).
198. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1954 (“As skin changes, stretches, R
shrinks, burns, and varies pigments, a tattoo on that changing skin morphs as well,
calling into question whether a tattoo can ever be fixed.”).
199. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Perry’s R
statement during Whitmill litigation); see also Commander, supra note 15, at 1962 R
(citing Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Whitmill
v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011)) (stating
how Judge Perry believes Whitmill has credible claim on merits). But see Minahan,
supra note 20, at 1727 (“Although the . . . application of the Copyright Act seems to R
indicate that, in general, tattoos could be copyrightable subject matter, the resolu-
tion of the issue should not be as obvious as Judge Perry would make it seem.”).
200. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732–36 (discussing this distinction). R
201. See id. at 1728 (discussing tattoo artists sketches in Reed and Escobedo). For
further discussion of Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. 2005), see supra
notes 110–116 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of Escobedo v. R
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claimed that there was copyright infringement on their tattoos;
however, the proper claims would have been copyright infringe-
ment on the preliminary drawings.202  The tattoo reproduction
based on the drawing was an unauthorized derivative work and
copy of the preliminary drawing.203
The tattoo artist in Whitmill contemporaneously designed and
tattooed the design on Tyson, which calls into question whether the
human body meets the requirement of being a “fixed tangible me-
dium” because the tattooist was claiming copyright ownership of
the tattoo, which is on human skin.204  It is important to first ex-
amine whether Congress intended the human body to be included
in the definition of ‘copies.’205  The dictionary definition of object
is “a thing that you can see and touch and that is not alive.”206
Since the human body does not fall into the purview of the diction-
ary definition of ‘object’ because it is a living thing, there is a high
probability that “Congress . . . did not intend to include human skin
within the category of mediums in which a copyrightable work
could be embodied.”207
THQ, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02470 (D. Ariz. 2012), see supra notes 117–123 and accom- R
panying text.
202. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1728 (“While the artists’ lawsuits alleged R
infringement of their tattoos, the alleged infringement is more properly character-
ized as an infringement on their drawings, not the completed tattoo.  Therefore,
when Reed and Escobedo allege the ownership of a copyright and infringement of
their rights, it is not a copyright in the tattoo, but a copyright in the preliminary
drawings.”).
203. See id. (noting that reproduction of preliminary sketch without authori-
zation is copyright infringement of preliminary sketch).
204. See id. at 1728–29 (discussing differences between sketches in Reed and
Escobedo and tattoo in Whitmill); id. at 1729 (citing Complaint at 2, Whitmill v.
Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011)) (“The ques-
tion of copyrightability in a case like Whitmill is complicated by the fact that there
were no copyrightable preliminary drawings upon which the Tyson tattoo was sub-
sequently based.  Therefore, when Whitmill registered his work with the Copyright
Office, his registration was for the tattoo fixed on Mike Tyson’s face, not a prior
drawing or sketch fixed on a piece of paper.”).
205. See id. at 1732 (discussing what Congress’s intentions were concerning
meaning of “copies” in Copyright Act); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Copies’ are mate-
rial objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device”).
206. Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732 (quoting Object, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, R
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/object [https://perma.cc/BE44-
V43Q] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017)).
207. Id. at 1732.  For further discussion about why Congress did not intend
for the human body to be considered a copy, see supra notes 147–153, 171, R
205–216 and accompanying text. R
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Reviewing the Copyright Act’s language also supports the asser-
tion that Congress did not intend for the human skin to be a me-
dium upon which an expression can be fixed.208  Section 102 of the
Copyright Act lists works of authorship, and Section 101 defines
each form of authorship as well.209  The closest form of authorship
a tattoo can fall under is an architectural work, but there is a major
hurdle that prevents contemporaneously designed and placed tat-
toos from falling under this form of authorship.210  First, the defini-
tion of architectural work is an option because just like buildings,
tattoos are an expression that needs a physical presence, as both are
not an actuality until they are formed into a tangible entity.211
What complicates this avenue from being successful is that contem-
poraneously designed and placed tattoos would not fall under this
category, but tattoos based on preliminary drawings would because
a design is required.212  Contemporaneously-placed tattoos are
placed on skin freehand, without any preparatory sketches or de-
signs, and because the Act states the “design of a building,” and
includes various forms of pre-planning, contemporaneously-placed
tattoos would not be eligible for copyright protection.213
208. Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732–33 (discussing why Congress did not R
intend for human body to be considered copyrightable under Copyright Act).
209. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (listing and defining works of authorship).
210. See Parker, supra note 59, at 771–78 (discussing tattoos as architectural R
works). But see Hatic, supra note 111, at 401 (citing § 102(a)(5)) (“Tattoos most R
likely fall under the category of pictorial or sculptural works.”).  Section 102(a)(5)
lists “architectural works” as a “work[ ] of authorship” afforded copyright protec-
tion under the Copyright Act.  Parker explains that the Architectural Works Copy-
right Protection Act (“AWCPA”), “signed into law on December 1, 1990,” amended
the Copyright Act “to include architectural works, and added Section 120: Scope
of Exclusive Rights in Architectural Works.”  Parker, supra note 59, at 771 n.65. R
Parker characterizes the AWCPA as “extend[ing] copyright protection to architec-
ture and to finished architectural works in ways that had never been seen before in
this country.” Id. at 771.
211. Parker, supra note 59, at 774 (“The AWCPA separates protection of the R
architect’s right in the design of the building from the building owner’s rights in
the physical building.  So too does our AWCPA-derived standard start from the
assumption that there are (and should be) different rights associated with the de-
sign and the physical tattoo.”).
212. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1735 (discussing distinction between pre- R
liminary sketches and contemporaneous tattoos).  For further discussion about the
difference between tattoos based on preliminary sketches and contemporaneous
tattoos, see supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. R
213. § 101; see Parker, supra note 59, at 774 (stating that utility of “the AWCPA R
is that it allows us to separate the two different ‘items’ involved in copyright dis-
putes over tattoos: the design and the actual tattoo”).  Section 101 of the Copyright
Act defines an “architectural work” as “the design of a building as embodied in any
tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or draw-
ings.  The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composi-
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Finally, because of the complications that come with balancing
the interest of the copyright owner and the interest of the tattoo
bearer, human skin is not a proper medium on which a work can be
fixed.214  In addition, human beings would not be deemed material
objects in which can be a copy, and later be reproduced.215  There-
fore, because skin does not meet the requirements to be considered
for copyright protection, contemporaneously-placed and prelimi-
nary-sketched tattoos are not copyrightable, only a preliminary
drawing.216
C. Public Policy Outweighs Tattoo Artists’ Intellectual
Property Rights
Tattoo bearers’ interests significantly outweigh the interests of
the tattoo artists.217  Extending protection to tattoos will cause a
slippery slope and make it difficult for the courts to draw a line
regarding how much control a tattoo artist can have over a tattoo’s
display and to what extent.218  Although tattoo artists’ interests
would be protected, it would be at a great cost.219  Not extending
copyright protection to contemporaneously-placed and prelimi-
nary-sketched tattoos does not mean tattoo artists do not have a
tion of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard
features.”
214. See id. at 773 (“Congress acted to protect the design of a building while
differentiating between that design and its physical representation . . . . Written
large in their choices is this differentiation and there is no reason why it should
not be applied to other areas that are thematically, if not literally, similar.”);
Minahan, supra note 20, at 1732 (“By defining ‘copies’ as ‘material objects,’ Con- R
gress likely did not intend to include human skin within the category of mediums
in which copyrightable work could be embodied.”).
215. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1735 (acknowledging that illogical result R
of including human bodies as material objects supports conclusion that human
bodies cannot be copies).
216. See id. (“In the case of tattoos created as they are applied to a person’s
skin, since the resultant tattoo would not be embodied in ‘copy,’ there would be
no copyright protection available for the tattoo.”).
217. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 308–09 (advocating this position); Hatic, R
supra note 111, at 420 (“In tattoo cases, because of the nature of the medium in R
which the copyrighted work is fixed, interests including the right to publicity and
the constitutional right to control one’s body must weigh more heavily in deter-
mining whether infringement occurred.”).
218. For further discussion about the negative consequence if tattooists are
permitted to enforce their exclusive rights against bearers of tattoos, see supra
notes 180–184 and accompanying text. R
219. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1978–79  (“Although most scholars R
and lawyers quickly agree that tattoos deserve copyright protection, they also rec-
ognize that the ‘potential for an artist to control a person’s public appearances
and activities is all too harmful to the ideals of  individual autonomy and free-
dom.’”) (quoting Cummings, supra note 13, at 309). R
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method to protect their work.220  Tattoo artists can make prelimi-
nary drawings that are subject to copyright protection.221
D. Defenses Against Preliminary Drawings
Tattoo artists can and should register their preliminary draw-
ings of celebrity tattoos if they desire copyright protection.222  It is
also true that as the bearer of the tattoo, celebrities should be per-
mitted to publicly display the work without being liable for copy-
right infringement, and, under limited circumstances, third parties
ought to be able to use the tattoo without infringing.223  There are
two defenses tattoo bearers and third parties can use if tattoo artists
claim that the tattoo bearers committed copyright infringement for
the public display of the tattoo: (1) fair use and (2) implied li-
cense.224  Both defenses strike a balance between a copyright
owner’s interest in protecting their copyrighted work, a tattoo
bearer’s interest in protecting their right of publicity and autonomy
concerns, and third parties’ interests to comment on and criticize a
work to increase dialogue in society.225
If a preliminary sketch was created prior to the design being
tattooed on a celebrity, the public display of the tattoo should be
treated as fair use only if the tattoo is not the primary focal point of
the celebrity’s public appearance.226  There are four factors to con-
220. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1728 (“In both Reed and Escobedo, the tat- R
too artists each based their tattoo upon drawings and sketches they created prior
to applying the tattoos to their respective clients.  Assuming for the purposes of
this Note that these preliminary drawings satisfied § 102(a), Reed and Escobedo
likely owned the copyrights in their drawings.”).
221. See id. (noting that tattoo artist that registered their preliminary drawings
probably had copyrights in their preliminary sketches).
222. See id. at 1728–29 (reiterating that tattoo artist can register their prelimi-
nary sketches to receive copyrights in the sketches).
223. See King 3, supra note 18, at 450–52 (discussing right of publicity).  For R
further discussion of a celebrity’s right of publicity, see supra notes 165–172 and R
accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., King 2, supra note 7, at 57–63 (discussing fair use and implied R
licenses); Commander, supra note 15, at 1965–69 (discussing fair use); id. at R
1974–76 (discussing implied licenses); see also supra notes 139–139 (discussing fair R
use); supra notes 154–162 (discussing implied licenses). R
225. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 316–17 (“Because the values of human R
dignity and individual autonomy are so firmly rooted in this nation’s core, a court
would be acting inappropriately if it did not eliminate any potential for a tattoo
artist to control a recipient’s public appearances to any degree.  This is a freedom
that cannot be forgone under the Thirteenth Amendment.”); Hatic, supra note
111, at 409–10 (discussing purposes of fair use doctrine stated in Section 107 of R
the Copyright Act).
226. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 317 (arguing that if public appearance is R
“for the specific purpose of showcasing or discussing the tattoo,” then fair use should
not apply); Hatic, supra note 111, at 410 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)) (“A copyright R
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sider when determining whether a reproduction of a copy is fair
use.227  These factors are as follows:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.228
Factors two and four can be used to persuade courts to deter-
mine that their public display of their tattoo is fair use.229  A celeb-
rity can argue that once the preliminary sketch was tattooed on her
and became so intertwined with her persona, the tattoo is no longer
a form of expression created by the tattoo artist, but a fact associ-
ated with the celebrity.230  Since the tattoo is an unprotected fact, a
celebrity can publicly display the tattoo when she desires because a
fact does not receive protection under copyright law.231  The other
owner must register his copyright before an infringement occurs to be eligible to
receive statutory damages and attorney’s fees under section 504(c).”).  For further
discussion about why public display of tattoo is fair use if the tattoo is not the
primary focal point, see infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text. R
227. See § 107 (listing factors); King 2, supra note 7, at 58 (listing factors); R
Cummings, supra note 13, at 292–93 (citing § 107) (discussing factors). R
228. § 107.
229. See King 2, supra note 7, at 62–63 (discussing utility of factors in court); R
Cummings, supra note 13, at 317 (discussing factor two of fair use doctrine). R
230. See King 1, supra note 36, at 158 (“Assuming that the human body is a R
useful article, tattoos are not physically separable from a person.  The tattoo is not
capable of existing independently of the human medium of expression.  A tattoo is
not akin to a lamp base, which can exist on its own.  A tattoo is a sufficiently perma-
nent part of the person’s body.”); Fair Use, BYU COPYRIGHT LICENSING OFFICE,
https://sites.lib.byu.edu/copyright/about-copyright/fair-use/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2017) (stating Factor Two, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” “will generally
weigh in favor of fair use if the work to be used is factual in nature (technical,
scientific, etc.), as opposed to works involving more creative expression, such as
plays, poems, fictional works, photographs, paintings, and so on”); see also HOWARD
B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:52 (2017) (“Two types of distinctions as to
the nature of the copyrighted work have emerged that have figured in the deci-
sions evaluating the second factor: (1) whether the work is expressive or creative,
such as a work of fiction, or more factual, with a greater leeway being allowed to a
claim of fair use where the work is factual or informational, and (2) whether the
work is published or unpublished, with the scope for fair use involving unpub-
lished works being considerably narrower.”).
231. Cf. New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Pub. Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir.
1990) (discussing copyright dispute over quotations from copyrighted works used
in biography).  The Second Circuit explained that:
[T]he scope of fair use is greater with respect to factual than non-factual
works.  While there is no bright-line test for distinguishing between these
two categories, we have referred to the former as works that are “essen-
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factor that can be used is that there is little to no effect of the use
on the market or value of the copyrighted work.232  If the tattoo was
specifically created for the celebrity, there was only a one-time use
for the design and no harm is done to the value of the design be-
cause the tattoo artist had no intention to showcase or replicate the
tattoo in the future.233  If the tattoo is a design that can be picked
out of a portfolio and has been tattooed on patrons multiple times,
the public display of the tattoo on the celebrity would increase
value of the tattoo instead of decrease because it is associated with
the celebrity.234  A celebrity can argue factors two and four to con-
vince a court that a public display of a tattoo is fair use.235  The
limitation attached to when a public display is fair use—if the tattoo
is not the primary focal point of the celebrity’s public appearance—
balances a tattoo artist’s interest in exercising control over the work
without having control over the bearer of the tattoo.236  Fair use
tially factual in nature,” or “primarily informational rather than creative.”
We have some hesitation in trying to characterize [L. Ron] Hubbard’s
diverse body of writings as solely “factual” or “non-factual,” but on bal-
ance, we believe that the quoted works—which deal with Hubbard’s life,
his views on religion, human relations, the Church, etc.—are more prop-
erly viewed as factual or informational.
Id. (citations omitted).
232. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450
(1984) (“The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.  Even
copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder’s ability to
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have.  But a use that has no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copy-
righted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to
create.”); see also BYU COPYRIGHT LICENSING OFFICE, supra note 230 (stating the R
fourth factor of fair use under Section 107 of Copyright Act “examines the antici-
pated effect of the use on the publisher’s market.  If the proposed use is likely to
become widespread and would negatively affect the market for or value of the
copyrighted work, this factor would weigh against fair use”).
233. See Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962,
971 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing effect of use on potential market factor).  In Bur-
nett, the court explained that the fourth fair use factor requires courts to “consider
‘the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged in-
fringer,’ as well as ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort en-
gaged in by the defendant ... would result in in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market’ for the original.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994)).
234. See id. (discussing effect of use on potential market factor).
235. But see id. (“Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would
have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable
evidence about relevant markets.”) (footnotes omitted); King 2, supra note 7, at R
62–63 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590) (“Factor four must also be determined in
context, but it is difficult for a defendant to succeed on this factor without
favorable evidence about relevant markets.”).
236. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 317 (“This qualification is included for R
fairness reasons—while it is undoubtedly good public policy to eliminate a tattoo
artist’s control over a recipient, that recipient should not be able to exploit this
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defense can be used by third parties under limited circumstances
such as “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholar-
ship, or research.”237  Third parties involved in a commercial indus-
try would have to try to create their work so that it falls within one
of the permissible uses if they do not want to be found as
infringers.238
If a court is not persuaded by a fair use defense, a celebrity can
always fall back on the argument that the tattoo artist gave an im-
plied nonexclusive license to allow her to display the tattoo.239  Ce-
lebrities can argue that they were given an implied license when the
tattoo artist tattooed the design on their bodies.240  It is reasonable
to conclude that tattoo artists do grant the right of public display to
their clients when the tattoo artist tattoos a design on their client’s
body without further notification of limitations associated with the
use of the tattoo.241
It is important to note than an implied license can be revoked
unless there is consideration.242  Consideration is established when
power.  Thus, if a recipient were to go on television for the specific purpose of show-
casing or discussing the tattoo, the recipient would still need to obtain express
authorization by the author to do this.”).
237. § 107; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135 (“Fair use is a legal R
doctrine that promotes freedom of expression by permitting the unlicensed use of
copyright-protected works in certain circumstances.  Section 107 of the Copyright
Act provides the statutory framework for determining whether something is a fair
use and identifies certain types of uses—such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching, scholarship, and research—as examples of activities that may qualify
as fair use.”).
238. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135 (stating that four factors to R
consider when assessing whether fair use applies and that weighing of factors de-
pend on circumstances).
239. See generally King 2, supra note 7, at 63–67 (discussing implied license to R
use tattoos); Bloom, supra note 154, at 458–70 (discussing implied license to use R
tattoos); Commander, supra note 15, at 1974–76 (discussing implied license to use R
tattoos); Hatic, supra note 111, at 431–33 (discussing implied license to use R
tattoos).
240. See, e.g., Commander, supra note 15, at 1975 (citing Hatic, supra note R
111, at 431–32) (“An artist can grant or imply a nonexclusive license by spoken R
word or even mere conduct.  An implied nonexclusive license does not transfer
any ownership interest in the copyrighted work to the licensee but allows the licen-
see to use the work in ways specified by the licensor.”).
241. See id. (noting that tattoo artists in Allen, Whitmill, and Escobedo “conceded
in their complaints that their athlete clients had an implied license to publicly
display the work in order to pursue a livelihood in acting and sports”); Bloom,
supra note 154, at 464 (“The tattoo artist recognizes that by his doing, the tattoo R
has become part of another person’s body and its use will no longer flow from his
hand.  Rather, the tattoo will now take its direction from the tattoo holder.  Be-
hind every tattoo artist’s actions, therefore, lies the intent to transfer specific rights
that may be exercised during the normal course of his life.”).
242. See King, supra note 7, at 67 (noting implied licenses are revocable when R
not supported by consideration); Bloom, supra note 154, at 470 (“An implied li- R
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a customer pays to get the tattoo adorned on his or her body.243
Therefore, when a tattoo artist receives payment for the tattoo and
places the tattoo on their client’s body, the implied license that was
granted is irrevocable.244  Furthermore, the irrevocable implied li-
cense does not extend to third parties.245  When an implied nonex-
clusive license is granted, the licensee does not have authority to
grant their implied license to a third party.246  The third party must
receive permission from the owner of the copyright.247  For exam-
ple, THQ’s use was not covered by the implied license Escobedo
gave to Condit when he placed the tattoo on Condit’s body.248
To sum up, the fair use defense and implied license defense
are cogent arguments that a celebrity may use if a tattoo artist
claims that she committed copyrighted infringement by publicly
displaying a tattoo.249  Under both defenses, the interests of the tat-
too artist and bearer of the tattoo are met by allowing the tattoo
artist to require authorization to publicly display a tattoo under lim-
ited circumstances that do not impede on a celebrity’s right to con-
cense is generally revocable by the copyright owner.  Where the license has been
revoked, further use of the copyrighted work will constitute infringement, absent
another affirmative defense.  An implied license that is supported by considera-
tion, however, is irrevocable.  Such a license is considered a contract.”).
243. See Bloom, supra note 154, at 470–71 (acknowledging potential argu- R
ment that “additional consideration be given for the implied license, particularly
where there is no showing that the license is part of the initial tattoo transaction,”
but concluding that consideration paid for tattoo also serves as consideration for
implied license to use tattoo).
244. See id. (“Nevertheless, when a tattoo artist grants an implied license to a
tattoo holder covering use of the copyrighted work during the normal course of
his being, such license is so closely bound with the transaction that it becomes
irrevocable.  A tattoo artist who accepts payment for his work also accepts that the
work will be used throughout the tattoo holder’s life.  Thus, the consideration paid
for the tattoo will also support use of the tattoo in such a manner.  It is inconceiv-
able that a tattoo holder would pay for a tattoo design that he could not display,
add to or remove.”).
245. See King 2, supra note 7, at 63 (“However, while the scope of this license R
may encompass commercial use of the work, particularly for clients who are ath-
letes and celebrities, the license does not cover commercial uses by third parties,
or in instances like Reed, a client’s cooperation with third parties’ commercial use
of a tattoo.”).
246. See DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, supra note 162 (noting that recipient of R
implied nonexclusive license cannot transfer their rights via transfer or license
without copyright owner’s authorization).
247. See id. (stating that third party must receive permission from copyright
owners to be granted license).
248. For further discussion about Escobedo, see supra notes 117–123 and ac- R
companying text.
249. For further discussion about the fair use and implied license defenses,
see supra notes 222–248 and accompanying text. R
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trol his or her body.250  Third parties are unable to use an implied
license as a defense because implied licenses do not include third-
party usage of a copyrighted work.251  However, the fair use defense
is a viable option if a third party uses a copyrighted work as some of
the listed ways in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.252
IV. CONCLUSION
Extending copyright protection to preliminary drawings and
not to contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched tat-
toos balances the purpose of the Copyright Act, societal policy con-
cerns, the copyright owner’s interest, and the tattoo bearer’s right
to control his or her body and not be subject to enslavement.253
Contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched tattoos
should not be afforded protection because human bodies do not
constitute objects that can be fixed.254 One effect of not granting
contemporaneously-placed and preliminarily-sketched tattoos copy-
right protection is that clients and third parties can use the tattoos
without restriction.255  To strike a balance between tattooists’ and
tattoo bearers’ interests, authors of preliminary drawings should be
afforded the exclusive rights provided under the Copyright Act.256
Their exclusive rights can be curtailed by implied licenses and fair
250. See supra notes 236 and accompanying text (discussing why public display R
of tattoo is fair use if the tattoo is not primary focal point); see also Cummings,
supra note 13, at 317 (noting limitation to fair use defense). R
251. See DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, supra note 162 (noting that recipient of an R
implied nonexclusive license cannot transfer their rights via transfer or license
without copyright owner’s authorization).
252. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
253. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries”); see also Cummings, supra note
13, at 318 (“By balancing important social policy goals, the artist-recipient relation- R
ship, and the text of the law, a compromise that protects human rights while sup-
porting tattoos as an artistic genre is indeed possible.”).
254. § 102(a); see supra notes 204–216 and accompanying text. R
255. See Minahan, supra note 20, at 1735 (“In the case of tattoos created as R
they are applied to a person’s skin, since the resultant tattoo would not be embod-
ied in a ‘copy,’ there would be no copyright protection available or the tattoo.
Therefore, the tattoo artist would have no intellectual property rights in the tattoo
that could restrict the client’s or third party’s use of the tattoo.”); see also supra
notes 204–216 and accompanying text. R
256. See supra notes 191–252 and accompanying text. R
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use.257  While celebrities can exercise their ability to publicly display
the tattoo, industries driven by celebrity athletes still have obstacles
to overcome to use preliminary drawings.258
If athletes desire to see their tattoos in major advertisements,
movies, or video games, it is best that they obtain a release from
their tattoo artist.259  Without a release, third parties in the sports
industry will have to obtain a license from the copyright owner.260
If it is too much work to obtain a license, athletes’ tattoos may not
be used at all.261  In the end, when preliminary drawings are later
tattooed on the human body and the ink dries, tattoo artists own
the copyrights to the drawings, not the tattoo itself.262
Chandel Boozer*
257. For further discussion about implied license and fair use defenses
against preliminary sketches, see supra notes 222–252 and accompanying text. R
258. See Commander, supra note 15, at 1976 (citing Darren Heitner, Questions R
Concerning Copyright of Athlete Tattoos Has Companies Scrambling, FORBES (Aug. 14,
2013, 8:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/08/14/ques
tions-concerningcopyright-of-athlete-tattoos-has-companies-scrambling/ (“During
the NFL Combine, a training camp for potential professional football players, the
Association correctly proposed the most ideal solution.  It ‘advised agents to tell
their players that when they get tattoos going forward, they should get a release
from the tattoo artist, and if they can track down their former artists, they should
get a release’ from them as well.”).
259. See Darren Rovell, New ‘Madden’: Deal Done in Ink, ESPN (June 5, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11036778/madden-15-feature-san-fran
cisco-49ers-qb-colin-kaepernick-tattoos [https://perma.cc/8B7E-CBMC] (noting
how Collin Kapernick had his tattoo artists sign waivers so that his tattoos could be
featured in Madden ‘15); see also Samit Sarker, Why Tattoos Are Just Now Returning to
Madden with NFL Madden 15, POLYGON (June 5, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.poly
gon.com/2014/6/5/5782540/madden-nfl-15-tattoos-returning-colin-kaepernick
[https://perma.cc/W8TW-NZ7W] (“As it stands, EA will only use real tattoos if the
athlete himself first goes out and secures the permission of the artists.  That’s ex-
actly what Kaepernick did, because he ‘takes his tattoos as a personal self-expres-
sion that he wants represented in any product or marketing thing that he’s a part
of,’ said Graddy.”) (quoting Madden NFL line Producer, Seann Graddy).
260. See DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, supra note 162 (noting that third party has R
to go to copyright owner to obtain a license to use copyrighted work).
261. See Zane Simon, Due to Past Lawsuit Trouble, EA’s UFC Game Will Not Fea-
ture Carlos Condit’s Tattoo, SBNATION (June 17, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloody
elbow.com/2014/6/17/5818700/ea-ufc-video-game-carlos-condit-tattoo-left-out-
lawsuit-mma-news [https://perma.cc/HFZ5-7JJT] (stating how due to past litiga-
tion with tattoo artist, Escobedo, Condit’s tattoo would not be featured in UFC
game).
262. See id. (“Condit’s artist, Chris Escobedo, claims that ‘they’re doing it
without consulting the original artists, and that’s what makes it illegal.’”) (quoting
Escobedo).
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. in Communication and Rhetoric, Minor in Sociology, and Certificate in
Corporate/Community Relations, University of Pittsburgh.
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